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Abstract
The two different layers of logical theory—epistemological and ontological—are considered and explained. Special atten-
tion is given to epistemic assumptions of the kind that a judgement is granted as known, and their role in validating rules of 
inference, namely to aid the inferential preservation of epistemic matters from premise judgements to conclusion judgement, 
while ordinary Natural Deduction assumptions (that propositions are true) serve to establish the holding of consequence 
from antecedent propositions to succedent proposition.
Keywords Assumption · Consequence · Judgement · Proof-object · Demonstration · Analytic, immediate inference
1  Two Perspectives in Logic
Following Archbishop Whatley’s Elements of Logic from 
1826 we say:
1.1  Logic may be Considered as the Science, 
and also as the Art, of Reasoning
When reasoning we carry out acts of passage, “inferences”, 
from granted premises to novel conclusions. Logic is Sci-
ence because it investigates the principles that govern rea-
soning and Logic is Art because it provides practical rules 
that may be obtained from those principles. Reasoning is 
par excellence an epistemic matter, dependent on a judging 
agent. If the ultimate starting points for such a process of 
reasoning are items of knowledge, accordingly a chain of 
reasoning in the end brings us to novel knowledge.
In today’ logic, on the other hand, inferences are not pri-
marily seen as acts, but as production-steps in the generation 
of derivations among metamathematical objects known as 
wff’s, that is, well-formed formulae. Furthermore, by the 
side of this metamathematical change regarding the status 
of inferences, an ontological approach has largely taken 
over from the previous epistemological one. This ontologi-
cal approach in logic began with another nineteenth cen-
tury cleric, namely the Bohemian Bernard Bolzano and 
his Wissenschaftslehre (1837). As is by now well-known 
Bolzano avails himself of certain denizens in a Platonic 
“Third Realm” that are known as Sätze an sich, that is, 
propositions-in-themselves, precisely half of which, namely 
the truths-in-themselves, are true. This notion of truth (-in-
itself), also considered as a Platonist in-itself notion, when 
applied to a proposition (in-itself), serves as the pivot for this 
novel rendering of logic.
In particular, Bolzano reduces the epistemic evaluative 
notions with respect to judgements and inferences, namely 
correctness and validity, to various matters of ontology per-
taining to these propositions-in-themselves. Thus the judge-
ment [A is true], in which truth is ascribed to the proposition 
(-in-itself) A that serves in the role of judgemental content, 
is deemed to be right, or correct (German richtig), if the 
proposition(-in-itself) in question really is a truth. Similarly 
the inference-scheme, or figure, I:
where each judgment  Ji is of the form proposition Ai is true, 
is deemed to be valid if, in modern terms, the relation of 
logical consequence, that is, preservation of truth “under 
all variations”, holds from the antecedent propositions  A1, 
 A2, ...  Ak that serve as contents of the premise-judgements 
 J1 …  Jk of the inference I to the proposition C that serves as 
J1 … Jk
J
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content of the conclusion. Another way of formulating the 
second Bolzano reduction may be found in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus (5.11, 5.35.132, 5.133, 6.1201, 6.1221). The infer-
ence J is valid if the implication  A1 &  A2 & ... &  Ak ⊃ C 
a logical truth, or, in the Tractarian terminology, a tautol-
ogy. Both formulations of this Bolzano reduction are close 
enough to what Bolzano actually says; his particular cavils 
regarding the compatibility of the antecedent propositions, 
and his conjunctive, rather than the customary current dis-
junctive reading of consequences with multiple consequent 
propositions we may, at the present level of generality, 
disregard.1
The epistemic conception of traditional logic is all-
out Aristotelian and stems from the early sections of 
the Posterior Analytics. The Aristotelian conception of 
demonstrative science organizes a field of knowledge by 
using axioms that are self-evident in terms of primitive 
concepts and proceeds to gain novel insights by applica-
tion of similarly self-evident rules of inference. Frege’s 
great innovation in logic can be seen as refining this tra-
ditional Aristotelian axiomatic conception by joining it 
to his notion of a formal language, with its concomitant 
notion of logical inference. Frege’s deployment of a novel 
form of judgement, namely proposition (“Thought”) A is 
true, where the content A has function/argument struc-
ture P(a), allowed him to develop a much richer view of 
what follows from what, in particular when drawing upon 
quantification theory. He did not change anything, though, 
with respect to epistemic demonstration (Beweis), which 
remains Aristotelian through and through. Thus, both the 
Preface to the Begriffsschrift as well §3 of Grundlagen 
der Arithmetik bear strong resemblance to the well-known 
regress argument unto first principles, with which Aristo-
tle opens the Posterior Analytics.
2  Two Views on Logical Language
Aristotle’s detailed account of consequence from the Prior 
Analytics, on the other hand, was of course superseded by 
Frege’s introduction of the formal ideography that comprises 
also quantification theory. Frege’s conception of a formal 
language, though, was different from our modern notion 
of a formal language (or perhaps better today: formal sys-
tem) that distinguishes between syntax and semantics and 
deploys two turnstiles: one “syntactic” |– that really is a 
metamathematical theorem-predicate with respect to wff’s, 
and indicates the existence of a suitable formal derivation, 
and one semantic |= that indicates “satisfaction” in a suit-
able model. Both turnstiles furthermore are relativized by 
including also assumptions in the guise of antecedent-for-
mulae to the left of the respective turnstile, thereby making 
matters even more complex. The second, model-theoretic 
notion plays no role in Frege, and his uses of the “syntactic” 
turnstile is radically different from the modern one: Frege’s 
sign serves as a pragmatic assertion indicator, whereas the 
modern one is a predicate—a propositional function if you 
want—that is defined on well-formed formulae. This differ-
ence is symptomatic of the difference in use between Frege’s 
formal language, i.e. his ideography (Begriffsschrift), on the 
one hand, and modern formal languages that, as a rule, are 
construed meta-mathematically, on the other hand.2 The lat-
ter can only be talked about; they are objects of study only, 
but are not intended for use. For instance, in Solomon Fefer-
man’s authoritative treatment of Gödel’s two Incompleteness 
Theorems one finds no “object language”; instead Fefer-
man (1960) proceeds directly to the Gödel numbers. Since 
the object “language” in question is never used for saying 
anything—its “metamathematical expressions” are not real 
expressions and do not express, but instead are expressed as 
the referents of real expressions—there is no need to display 
such an object language: it is only talked about, but in con-
tradistinction to other languages, it is not a vehicle for the 
expression of thoughts.3
Frege’s ideography, on the other hand, is an interpreted 
formal language, and he spent a tremendous effort on 
meaning explanations, for instance, in the early sections 
of Begriffsschrift, for the predicate logic version of the ide-
ography from 1879, and in the opening sections §§1–32 
of Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Vol I, from 1893, espe-
cially the §§27–31. It should be noted that this Grundge-
setze version of the Fregean ideography is not a predicate 
logic, but a term logic, which sometimes serves to make 
matters hard to understand when viewed from the preva-
lent standard of today, where theories are routinely formu-
lated in predicate logic. In Frege’s late piece of writing, 
the Nachlass fragment Logische Allgemeinheit that was left 
uncompleted at the time of his death, we find a distinction 
between a Hilfssprache and a Darlegungssprache. The Edi-
tors of Frege’s “Posthumous Writings” deliberately point 
to Tarski and translate Hilfssprache as object-language and 
Darlegungssprache as meta-language. This translation, 
however, is not felicitous. The term Hilfssprache is the 
1 Detailed attributions in the Wissenschaftslehre for the claims 
regarding Bolzano can be found in my 2009, § 3 ‘Revolution: Bolza-
no’s Annus Mirabilis’.
2 Barnes (2002) convincingly argues the use of the term ideography 
as a translation of German Begriffsschrift.
3 Sundholm (2002) treats in some detail of the distinction between 
expressions and metamamthematical expressions, whereas the advan-
tages of interpreted formal languages are argued in Sundholm (2001, 
2003).
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German rendering of the French langue auxiliaire, which 
term stands for the artificial languages that were considered 
in the artificial languages movement, of which Frege’s cor-
respondents Couturat and Peano were prominent members.4 
Examples that spring to mind are Volapük, Bolak, Espe-
ranto, and today also Klingon, and on the scientific side 
Interlingua, Latine sine flexione in which Peano wrote a 
famous paper on differential equations. Frege’s Begriffss-
chrift is precisely such an artificial auxiliary language—a 
Hilfssprache—and the difference between it and other aux-
iliary languages is that it is a formal one. Nevertheless, 
just as Esperanto and Volapük, it was intended for express-
ing meaning, and accordingly one needs a “language of 
display” in order to set it out properly. All the languages 
in the Russell -Tarski tower of “meta-languages” (over the 
first object-language) are also object-languages, and are 
ultimately only spoken about.5 The real meta-language is 
Curry’s “U language”—U for use—and it needs a vantage 
point outside the Russell–Tarski hierarchy in question.6 
Frege’s Darlegungssprache matches Curry’s U language 
and his Hilfssprache is an auxiliary language like Volapük, 
Bolak, and Esperanto championed by Couturat and Peano 
(Interlingua, Latine sine flexione).
Of course, the two different versions of Frege’s ideogra-
phy in Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze are Hilfssprachen 
and must be explained, that is, dargelegt, or spelled out. 
The editors of the Nachlass compliment Frege for having 
here anticipated the precise object-language/meta-language 
distinction that was put firmly onto the philosophical firma-
ment a decade later by Carnap (1934) in Logische Syntax 
der Sprache and by Tarski in Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den 
formalisierten Sprachen. However, as we saw Frege’s Hilf-
ssprache is not an artefact void of meaning, that is, it is not 
an uninterpreted, “object-language”: on the contrary, it is 
an auxiliary language in the terminology of the artificial 
language movement.
Up to ± 1930 every logician of note followed Frege’s lead 
when constructing formal calculi, marrying their formal lan-
guages to the Aristotelian conception of Science: Whitehead 
and Russell, Ramsey, Lesniewski, early Carnap (Aufbau and 
Abriss), Curry, Church, early Heyting …. 7Their systems 
were interpreted calculi intended as epistemological tools. 
The mathematical study of mathematical language was natu-
rally begun by Hilbert as part of his ideological programme 
of applying positivistic verificationism to mathematics. Here 
equations between finitistically computable terms serve as 
analogues of positivist observation sentences. Such formulae 
[s = t] are even known as “verifiable propositions” in the 
magisterial Hilbert and Bernays (1934, 1939).8
In the Warsaw seminar of Lukasiewicz and Tarski during 
the second half of the 1920s, the study of formal languages 
and formal systems—Many-valued Logics!—was liberated 
from the Göttingen finitist ideological shackles of Hilbert. 
From hence on ordinary mathematical means were allowed 
in the meta-mathematical study of formal systems, much in 
the same way that naïve set theory was used in the develop-
ment of set theoretic topology and cardinal arithmetic at 
which Polish mathematicians then excelled. With this liber-
ating move, yet a further radical shift of perspective occurs. 
The formal systems no longer serve any epistemological 
role per se. Instead, strictly speaking, the “well-formed 
formulae” lack meaning, and do not as such express. They 
are mathematical objects on par with other mathematical 
objects; in fact, formally speaking, the meta-mathematical 
expressions are elements of freely generated semi-groups of 
strings. With this shift in the role of the “languages” of logic, 
epistemic matters are driven even further into the back-
ground. The logical calculi are not used for epistemological 
purposes anymore. One only proves theorems about them.
During the 1920s the Grundlagenstreit came to the fore 
and sharp epistemological problems were raised. After Brou-
wer’s criticism of the unlimited use of the Law of Excluded 
Middle, there appear to be only two viable options with 
respect to logic. We may keep Platonistic impredicativity 
and LEM as freely used in classical analysis after the fash-
ion of Weierstrass, or we may jettison them. We have already 
seen the other dichotomy of options, namely to consider 
formal systems based on languages with meaning, on the 
one hand, and based on uninterpreted formal calculi, on the 
other. After Gödel’s work, attempts to resuscitate Fregean 
logicism, for instance by Carnap, no longer seemed viable 
and were abandoned: retaining classical logic as well as 
impredicativity, while insisting on explicit meaning-explana-
tions that render axioms and rules of inference self-evident, 
simply seems to be asking too much. Thus we may jettison 
either meaning for the full formal language, while retaining 
classical logic and impredicativity, which is the option cho-
sen by Hilbert’s formalism. Only his “real” sentences, that is, 
the “verifiable” equations between finitist terms, and which 
serve as the analogue to the observation sentences of posi-
tivism, have meaning, whereas other sentences, the “ideal” 
ones, strictly speaking, are not given meaning-explanations.
For the second option on the other hand we may jettison 
classical logic and Platonist impredicativity, but then offer 
4 I owe my awareness of these origins of Frege’s Hilfssprache to the 
scholarship of Wolfgang Künne, cf. Künne (2010), Chap. 5, §5, pp. 
725–738.
5 Russell’s Introduction to Wittgenstein (1922) and Tarski (1936).
6 Curry (1963), Chap 2, §§1 and 2, is the locus classicus for the U 
language.
7 Sundholm (2001). 8 ((1934, §6) section c, third part: Verifizierbare Formeln.
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meaning explanations for constructivist language after the 
now familiar fashion of Heyting.9
Classical logic
/ \
Language with content Accept Reject
Yes Logicism Intuitionism
No Formalism ?
The hope of Carnap and others for meaning-explanations 
for the full language of say, second order analysis that ren-
der evident classical logic and impredicativity appears to 
be forlorn. We may then follow Hilbert confining meaning 
only to a “real” fragment, while the “ideal sentences” of full 
language remain uninterpreted, or we may jettison classical 
logic and impredicativity, and follow Heyting’s by now well-
known way of giving constructive meaning-explanations 
with respect to the full language.
3  Constructive Meaning‑Explanations 
and the Two Layers of Logic
With his Constructive Type Theory Per Martin-Löf has 
given streamlined form to Heyting’s “Proof Explanation 
of the intuitionistic logical constants”: a proposition A is 
explained by laying down how its canonical proofs may 
be put together out of parts (and when two such canoni-
cal proofs are equal canonical proofs of the proposition 
A).10 Accordingly, for each proposition A, we have a “type” 
Proof(A) and define a notion of truth for propositions by 
means of an application of the truthmaker analysis:A is 
true = Proof(A) exists.11
Here the relevant notion of existence cannot be, on pain 
of an infinite regress, that of the existential quantifier. Classi-
cally, we may choose it to be Platonist set-theoretic existence 
and drawing upon classical reasoning one readily checks that 
the semantics verifies the Law of Excluded Middle. Thus, 
if we are prepared to reason Platonistically when justifying 
the rules of inference and axioms, casting the semantics in 
terms of the Heyting proof-explanation does not force us to 
abandon classical logic. This, however, yields no epistemic 
benefits, and so I prefer to use the Brouwer–Weyl construc-
tive notion of existence with respect to types α.12 When α is 
a type (general concept),
is a judgement and its assertion condition is given by a rule 
of instantiation
We note that propositions are given by truth-conditions 
that are defined in terms of (canonical) proofs, and (epis-
temic) judgements are explained in terms of assertion condi-
tions. Thus we get an ensuing bifurcation of notions at both 
the ontological level of propositions, their truth, and their 
proofs (that is, their truthmakers), and on the epistemic level 
of judgements and their demonstrations.13
In the table below the epistemological and ontological 
two sides of logic are spelled out for a fairly large number of 
notions, and in other writings I have dealt with most of the 
lines. In the sequel of the present paper I intend to deal with 
the line contrasting an assumption that a proposition is true 
with an epistemic assumption that a judgement is known, 
with as a special case an assumption that a proposition is 
known to be true.
Epistemic notion Ontological (“Alethic”) notion
Judgement (assertion) Proposition












Assumption that a judgement is 
known
Assumption that a proposition is 
true
Hypothetical demonstration Dependent proof-object
Hypothetical judgement Implicational proposition
Definitional (criterial) equality Propositional identity
(Function) Generality Quantifier
 exists




11 A fairly comprehensive introduction to Martin-Löf’s CTT can be 
found in my (1977). See also the paper by Ansten Klev in the present 
issue of TOPOI. That Heyting’s explanation of truth as existence of a 
proof (-object) is a kind of truth-maker analysis was first suggested in 
my (1994a).
12 As is well known, Tarski’s definition of truth does not on its own 
yield the Law of Excluded Middle for the notion of truth thus defined. 
Classical reasoning in the meta-theory is required for that. In my 
(2004) I carry out the pendant reasoning and show that, when classi-
cal meta-theory is allowed, it is very easy to validity LEM, also under 
the Heyting semantics.
13 In my (1997), (2000), and (2012) the demonstration versus proof 
distinction is given more substance.
9 The various options regarding retention of classical reasoning and 
meaning explanations are spelled out in some details in my 1998a.
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4  Four Different Notions of Consequence
Apart from the two changes already indicated—the meta-
mathematical shift and the Bolzano reduction of inferential 
validity to logical truth (or logical consequence) in “all vari-
ations”—we then have occasion to consider another major 
invention of the early 1930s, namely Gentzen’s Natural 
Deduction derivations and his Sequent Calculi.
Within the interpreted perspective of an interpreted for-
mal language, with respect to two propositions A and B, 
there are at least four relevant notions of consequence here.
(1) the implication proposition A⊃B, which may be true 
(or even logically true “in all variations”);
(2) the conditional [if A is true then B is true],
  or, in other words,
(3) the consequence [A = > B] may hold;
(4) the inference [A is true. Therefore: B is true] may be 
valid.14
Fact 1 “implies” takes that-clauses, whereas “if-then” 
takes complete declaratives. Ergo:implication and condi-
tional are not the same. The conditional (2) is a hypotheti-
cal judgement in which hypothetical truth is ascribed to the 
proposition B. Its verification-object is a dependent proof-
object b:Proof(B) [x:Proof(A)], that is, b is a proof of B 
under the assumption (hypothesis, supposition) that x is a 
proof of A.
The consequence (3) is a Gentzen sequent (German 
Sequenz). (Why, we may ask, did Gentzen drop the prefix 
Kon here?)
The judgement
is a generalization of [A is true] and demands for its veri-
fication a mapping (higher-level function) f: Proof(A) → 
Proof(B). Since implication and conditional are different, 
this is not the proof-object demanded for the truth of an 
implication: these have the canonical form λ (A, B, [x]b), 
or if your prefer the logical formulation, rather than the set-
theoretical one:
B is ,  that A is true
 that A is true
under assumption that A is true
[A => B]
⊃ I(A,B, [x]b),
where b is a dependent proof of B, under the assumption 
that x is a proof(A), and have a special application function 
ap(y,x), whereas application in the case of f is primitive:
Fact 2 The judgement (1)–(3) have different meaning-
explanations—their assertion conditions are not the same—
and accordingly do not mean the same, are not synonymous, 
while (4) indicates acts of passage. The first three notions, 
however, are equi-assertible. Given a verification-object 
for one of the three, verification-objects for the other two 
are readily found in a couple of trivial steps. Furthermore, 
all four relations are refuted by the same counter-example, 
namely a situation in which A is known to be true and B 
known to be false. This might serve to explain why the four 
notions have sometimes been hard to keep apart, especially 
from the classical point of view.15
Fact 3 Bolzano deals ably with consequence, whereas his 
account of inference is inadequate and quite psychologistic 
in terms of Gewissmachungen.16 Frege, on the other hand, 
deals ably with inference, but (logical) consequence has 
no place in his system. Only with Gentzen’s 1936 sequen-
tial formulation of Natural Deduction, where the derivable 
objects are sequents, that is consequences, and where the 
principal introduction and elimination inferences all take 
place to the right of the sequent-arrow, do we get a system 
that can cope both with inference and consequence.17
Fact 4 Consequence, not logical consequence, is the 
primary notion. Gentzen’s system deals with arithmetic; 
his rules of inference that take us from premise-sequent(s) 
to conclusion-sequent are obviously valid, but they do not 
hold logically in all variations. They are only “arithmeti-
cally valid”.
Fact 5 A completeness theorem for an interpreted formal 
language would state: all truths (and in the case of Gentzen’s 
system: all sequents that hold) are derivable by means of 
these rules. For Gödelian reasons, interesting systems with 
theorems of the form [A is true] are not complete. 18
When we now consider how one would establish that 
(1) to (4) obtain, we see that for (1)–(3) ordinary natural 
deduction derivations are involved in one way or another. In 
when a ∶ Proof(A), then f(a) ∶ Proof(B).
14 My (1998) and (2012) explain the inter-relations of notions (1)–(4) 
in considerable detail.
15 The afterword to my (2012) gives more details concerning the 
kinds of function—Euler-Frege functions, Dedekind mappings, and 
courses-of-value—that serve as verification witnesses for, respec-
tively, conditionals, closed consequences (“sequents”), and implica-
tional propositions.
16 Volume III of the Wissenschaftslehre contains Bolzano’s account 
of Gewissmachungen.
17 In (2006), at p. 632, and (2009), at p. 298, the links between Frege 
and Gentzen are explored further.
18 I explore these Gödel phenomena in (2004a, §8).
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all three cases one needs a hypothetical proof b:Proof (B) 
[x:Proof(A)].
The implication A⊃B is established by forming the 
course-of-value λ (A, B, [x]b), whereas the conditional 
is already established by the hypothetical, dependent 
proof-object in question. Finally, forming the function [x]
b:Proof(A) → Proof(B) by means of “lambda” abstraction 
[] (Curry’s notation!) on the hypothetical proof establishes 
that the closed consequence (“sequent”) holds.
5  Blind Judgement and Inference
Under the Bolzano reduction, when the proofs (“verification 
objects”) work also in all variations, then classically one 
says that the inference (4) is valid. However, the Bolzano 
reduction validates what we may, in the excellent terminol-
ogy of Brentano, call blind judgement and inference.19 The 
epistemic link to the judging reasoner has here been severed, 
whereas I am concerned to preserve this link.
Consequence preserves truth from antecedent proposi-
tions to consequent proposition, and logical consequence 
does so “under all variations”. The demonstration of the 
Prime Number Theorem (PNT) by De la Vallée-Poussin 
and Hadamard in 1896 certainly could be formalized within 
NBG, the set theory of Von Neumann, Bernays and Gödel.20 
Since this theory is finitely axiomatized, we may conjoin its 
axioms into one proposition VNBG and then consider the 
inference
The inference (*), certainly, is truth-preserving, in the 
in the light of the formalized demonstration offered and the 
Soundness Theorem for the Predicate Calculus: every time 
an NBG axiom is used in the predicate logic derivation we 
replace it by the proposition VNBG and then apply conjunc-
tion elimination. Hence we get a formal derivation of PNT 
from VNBG, whence the Soundness Theorem guarantees 
truth-preservation. So under the Bolzano reduction this is 
a valid inference, because truth-preserving under all varia-




6  Epistemic Assumptions
Instead, validity of inference, rather than (logical) holding 
of consequence, involves preservation, or transmission, of 
epistemic matters from premises to conclusion and it is here 
that epistemic assumptions that judgements are known (or 
granted) become helpful. In order to validate the inference 
I one makes the assumption that one knows the premise-
judgments, or that they are being given as evident, and under 
this epistemic assumption one has to make clear that also the 
conclusion can be made evident.21
The difference between the two types of assumptions is 
especially clear when we consider Gentzen derivations in 
Natural Deduction. An ordinary assumption A of Natural 
Deduction corresponds to an alethic, ontological assump-
tion that proposition A is true. From such an assumption we 
may, for instance, obtain a conclusion that B is true, when 
we have already established the conditional judgement,($) 
B is true, on hypothesis that A is true,
Furthermore, if we wish to do so, from this we readily 
obtain also the outright assertion that the implication A⊃B 
is true by implication introduction, or, for that matter, if we 
so wish, but now with the aid of functional abstraction on 
the dependent proof-object that warrants ($), we also may 
conclude that the sequent [A → B] holds.
An epistemic assumption that a judgement [A is true] is 
known, or perhaps better granted, corresponds for Natural 
Deduction derivations to the hypothesis that we have been 
provided with a closed derivation of the proposition A. This 
is patently a different kind of assumption from the ordinary 
Natural Deduction assumption of the wff A.
Brouwer did not accept hypothetical proofs—I hesitate to 
call them proof-objects in his case. His proofs are all epis-
temic demonstrations: an assumption that a proposition is 
true amounts to an assumption that the assumed proposition 
is known to be true, for instance in his demonstration of the 
Bar Theorem.22
21 Martin-Löf (1984), for instance at p. 41, avails himself of epis-
temic assumptions”“Assuming that we know the premisses …” (my 
emphasis). He does not, however, then formulate the explicit notion, 
which, or so it appears, was introduced in my (1997, p. 210).
22 Brouwer’s Demonstration of the Bar Theorem, with its particular 
use of an epistemic assumption, is discussed in detail by Sundholm 
and Van Atten (2008).
19 Brentano (1889, Anm. 27, pp. 64–72) and Brentano (1930), 
where, in particular, the fragments in part IV are important.
20 Mendelson (1964, Chap. 4) contains a rich exposition of NBG.
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7  Gentzen’s Two Frameworks for Natural 
Deduction Ans Epistemic Assumptions
Over the past decades I have had a discussion with Dag 
Prawitz about the status of the proofs in the BKH explana-
tion: I have claimed that they are not demonstrations with 
epistemic power, but that they are mathematical witnesses, 
corresponding to truthmakers in currently popular theories 
of grounding. Prawitz, on the other hand, has held that they 
are epistemically binding.23 With my present terminology 
I can formulate my principal objection thus: the distinc-
tion between epistemic and alethic assumptions collapses 
if proofs are held to be epistemically binding. There will be 
no difference between assuming that proposition A is true 
and assuming that one knows that A is true.
In type theory the difference between the two kinds 
of assumption comes out in different treatments of 
proof-objects. An ordinary assumption has the form 
x:Proof(A):assume that x is a proof for A
An epistemic assumption with respect to the same propo-
sition takes a closed proof-object as given:assume that I am 
given a closed proof a:Proof(A)
Against the background of these distinctions we can now 
explain the difference between the two Gentzen frameworks 
for Natural Deduction.
The 1932 format from the dissertation is the usual one 
with assumption formulae as top nodes in derivations
1936 format, on the other hand, is an axiomatic calculus for 
deriving consequences of the form, where the assumption 
formulae are listed
1936 derivations are best seen as demonstrations of judg-
ments of the form:
Derivations in the 1932 format, on the other hand, are to 
my mind best seen, not as epistemic demonstrations, but as 
dependent proof-objects Π of the form
that is, Π is a proof of C under the assumptions that  x1 …  xk 





A1 …Ak → C
[





x1A1 … xk ∶ Ak
)
,
8  Epistemic Assumptions and Analytic 
Validation of Inferences
In recent work, Per Martin-Löf has given an interesting dia-
logical twist to epistemic assumptions.25 Already in his first 
1946 paper on performatives, etc., John Austin wrote:
If I say “S is P” when I don’t even believe it, I am 
lying: if I say it when I believe it but am not sure of it, 
I may be misleading but I am not exactly lying. ………
When I say “I know”, I give others my word: I give 
others my authority for saying that “S is P”.26
Assertions contain implicit, first-person knowledge 
claims (recall G. E. Moore and asserting that it is raining, but 
that one does not believe it!), so assertions grant authority.
When I first read Austin in 2009 I was led to formulate an 
Inference Criterion of the same kind:
When I say “Therefore” I give others my authority for 
asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the 
premisses.
Martin-Löf has now noted that one does not need to know 
that the premises are evident for the validation of an infer-
ence: what one must be prepared to undertake is to make 
the conclusion known or evident under the assumption that 
someone else grants the premises as evident.
In order to undertake that responsibility it is enough if I 
possess a chain of immediately evidence-preserving steps (in 
terms of meaning-explanations) that link premises to conclu-
sion.27 Here the introduction rules of Gentzen may be seen 
as immediate and meaning explanatory, whereas the elimi-
nation rules are immediate, but not meaning explanatory. In 
Kantian terms, both the introduction and elimination rules 
are analytically valid, but only the introduction rules are 
explicitly analytic, or “identical”, whereas the analyticity of 
the elimination rules is implicit, and might need to be made 
explicit in terms of the meaning explanations offered by the 
introduction rules, in analogy with:
All rational animals are rational
is an explicitly analytic (identical) judgement, whereas
23 For an early instalment in this debate, see my 2000, with a reply 
by Prawitz in the same issue of Theoria.
24 My (2006) is devoted to spelling out the differences, with respect 
to an interpreted calculus, between Gentzen’s 1932 and 1936 ways of 
setting out his derivations.
25 In lectures at SND, Paris 2015, and at Marseille 2016, at the meet-
ing that provides the source for the present issue of TOPOI.
26 Austen (1946, p. 171).
27 I suggested this treatment of inferential validity in an invited lec-
ture at LOGICA 1996, and published it the next year in the LOGICA 
Yearbook; it is now readily available in my (2012), p. 950. It is also 
dealt with in (2004a), pp. 454–455.
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All humans are rational
is also an analytic judgement, but only implicitly so, and 
one resolution-step, replacing the term human by its defini-
tion rational animal, is needed to bring this judgement to 
explicitly analytic form.28
In order to complete the comparison, we consider the 
question:
Why is &-elimination rule valid?
We are then, in an epistemic assumption, given as evident 
the premise-judgement
(i) c:Proof (A&B)
  for an application of &-elimination.
  Under this epistemic assumption we have to make 
evident the conclusion
(ii) p(c): Proof(A).
  Since c is a proof of A&B, it executes, (evaluates, is 
definitionally equal) to a canonical proof of A&B that 
accordingly has the form
(iii) <a,b>: Proof(A&B) and c = < a,b>: Proof(A&B),
  where we know that
(iv) a :Proof(A) and b:Proof(B).
  But granted this, it is a meaning stipulation for the 
ordered-pair- and projection-operators that
(v) p(< a,b>) = a:Proof(A)
  but, since c = < a,b>: Proof(A&B), we also get 
p(c) = p(< a,b>) = a :Proof(A), whence we are done.
Note here these deliberations are all pursuant to the rel-
evant meaning explanations for the notions Proof, &, < >, 
and p. The step from (i) to (iii) and (iv) matches the resolu-
tion- step that replaces human by rational animal.
9  Axiom and Lemma from an Epistemic 
Point of View
Finally, what does this mean for axioms in the traditional 
sense? Such axioms were self-evident judgements, and 
known as such. The work of Pasch and Hilbert in geometry 
initiated a change that led to a hypothetical-deductive con-
ception, which replaced the epistemic notion of inference 
from self-evident axioms with the model-theoretic notion 
of logical consequence “under all variations” or “in all 
models”. Natural Deduction added one more feature here 
to the dethroning of axioms: they now become ordinary 
assumptions among other ordinary assumptions, but as such 
they are privileged, because they need never be discharged, 
and may be discounted, when standing in antecedent posi-
tion in consequences. Nevertheless, contrary to axioms in 
the old-fashioned sense, they are not known, nor are they 
asserted whenever they occur. An axiom in the old sense 
was not an assumption: it was asserted, whereas now that 
epistemic status is gone, and instead axioms are unasserted 
assumptions among other assumptions, with the privilege of 
not carrying the onus of discharge on them.
In conclusion then let me just note that epistemic assump-
tions are well known in mathematical practice when one 
draws upon a lemma, the demonstration of which is left out 
until the main demonstration has been completed. Never-
theless, within the main demonstration, the lemma does not 
work as an additional assumption, but avails itself of asser-
toric force, even though proper grounding by means of a 
demonstration is as yet absent. A very clear case here is the 
so-called Zorn’s Lemma, whose epistemic status is highly 
debatable from the point of view of constructivism, but clas-
sically is granted axiomatic status.
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